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Our Boer War?

14 May 2007 04:22 pm

Daniel Larison, in the course of arguing - rightly, I think - that Woodrow Wilson's foreign-policy legacy was far more disastrous than George W. Bush's will prove to be, makes a provocative comparison:

As large as Iraq looms on the scene today, as politically significant as the war is today, and as much as it will sour the public on intervention in the near future, I think we may be surprised at how quickly the effects of the war pass away and recede into the distance. Calamitous and awful as it has been, it still remains a war on a relatively limited scale and will wind up having a primarily regional impact. It has acquired the prominence that it has because it involves the superpower, but it will ultimately probably possess the historical significance of the Boer War or some other colonial misadventure of the British Empire.

One might also conjure up an analogy from America's own past - our long counter-insurgency in the Phillipines, which dragged on for more than a decade and cost more than 4,000 American and hundred of thousands (!) of Filipino lives, only to be completely forgotten by most people a century later. I've always been partial to the Filipino analogy, but it's worth remembering that the Phillipines, like the Transvaal, was a distinctly peripheral theater in the early 1900s, which substantially reduced the war's ripple effect on geopolitics; Iraq, on the other hand, is rather more centrally located, and sits athwart a region that matters a great deal to the global order (Edward Luttwak's provocations aside), at least until its oil wells run dry. So there's always a chance - albeit a small one, I think - that the Iraq War will prove a prelude to a larger conflagration of some kind, playing the Spanish Civil War to a Mesopotamian World War II.

If no such wider conflagration ensues, though, the best analogy for Iraq may be the one everyone always falls back on already, Vietnam - a war whose geopolitical significance proved negligible in the long run, and whose most profound consequences played themselves out on the American home front.

Oh, and just as Vietnam didn't mean the end of America's status as a global superpower, neither will the Iraq War. That outcome, at least, I'd be happy to put money on.

Comments (25)

But the Boer War did have significant implications. It marginalized those in the Liberal Party who opposed it, creating a group of Liberal Imperialists who increasingly saw eye-to-eye witht the Conservatives in favour of an aggressive foreign policy. One of these was Asquith. And, in Germany, it helped those who wanted a stronger presence in Africa and stirred up dislike of the British. These things mattered a dozen years later.

I hope you're right, of course, Ross, but I'm not willing to sign on just yet.

First off, our fiscal, military, and dipomatic weakness brought on by this war might push us into a less favorable position vis a vis a rising potential rival in China.

Also, the Filipinos we wronged didn't have a lot of super angry buddies in their part of the world who were willing to come to the US and its allies and kill people.

Increased terrorism, and some more poorly thought out actions by the US in response, is another way that the Iraq legacy might continue to drag us down for decades, even if no larger conflagration happens.

I tend to think of the French-Algerian war of the late '50s and '60s as the closest analogue to Iraq. Yes, the colons had been their for a century, but unlike Vietnam, Iraq has no foreign power providing substantial assistance (Iran does seem to be providing some materiel, and a few foreign fighters do show up, but it seems that the bulk of the violence is within). One can then note that after France executed a negotiated withdrawal from Algeria that addressed the primary grievances, Algerians didn't start crossing the Mediterranean to attack France. It wasn't until the '90s that Islamic terrorism in France started up again, as a small number of the growing Muslim minority in France--which makes little to no attempt at cultural assimilation--that Algerian terrorism against the French became a problem.

Indeed, to provide cheap labor to replace the 500,000 French soldiers in Algeria, the French government increased imports of workers from Algeria by 30% during the war.

How'd that work out for them?

Well, it seemed like a good idea at the time.

And not to nitpick, but withdrawal from Vietnam helped to bring the Khmer Rouge to power next door, with devastating consequences for the people of Cambodia. Laos was similarly, perhaps more directly, a consequence of Vietnam too. So while the geopolitical significance was somewhat muted, it had very significant humanitarian consequences.

If no such wider conflagration ensues, though, the best analogy for Iraq may be the one everyone always falls back on already, Vietnam - a war whose geopolitical significance proved negligible in the long run, and whose most profound consequences played themselves out on the American home front.

Ditto what AC said. And the only reason Vietnam didn't have larger consequences was because Reagan came along to re-establish American geopolitical dominance. But that was hardly a foreordained conclusion; it is foolish to think that we can automatically recover from major blows to our power & prestige, especially when it isn't necessary to give up said power & prestige in the first place (in Vietnam, we crushed the Viet Cong during the Tet offensive, and very likely would have one the war within a fairly short period of time if the chattering class & political class hadn't prematurely given up). Iraq is not lost, and some more persistence by the political class & punditocracy would go a long way. But, it's much easier to throw up ones hands, blame Bush, and walk away when it's not one's own family that will be slaughtered in the aftermath.

Mike S - Provide any sort of real evidence that the Vietnamese would have surrendered after Tet. The VC were crushed as a military force but maintained their village structure. This was only assaulted with pacification under CORDS, which was middling succcessful until 1972. Still ARVN had to garrison hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the countryside, over 300k in the Mekong for instance, just to maintain this tenuous hold.

After the Easter Offensive in 1972, most of this "progress" was wiped out. The Easter Offensive failed as an end-the-war offensive, but it succeeded in getting the ARVN to bunker down in cities and paved the way for its utter destruction in 1975.

Also the fact that Cambodia was the most bombed country in the world by 1975 probably helped a lot more in the rise of the Khmer Rouge, who never would have to power under Sihanouk.

How much of that ordinance fell on Phnom Penh? The idea that our bombing relatively unpopulated staging areas is what brought the Khmer Rouge to power, rather than the equipment and backing of the Chinese, is one of those questionable assertions that those who wanted to revel in their 'success' in getting us out of Vietnam regurgitate ad nauseum. And while the situation wasn't terribly promising in 72-73, the steady withdrawal of troops after Nixon's ascension didn't help matters.

losing Vietnam only didn't matter if you don't care about the people massacred in Cambodia as a result of the pull-out. domino-theory was true -- what was wrong was the fact that we stopped caring if the dominoes fell.

Somewhere between 50,000 and 150,000 Cambodians, at minimum were killed by the bombings. This recent article reveals that bombings were in fact far more intense than previously realized, which means the body count is probably much higher. Refugees generated is around 1-1.5m.

The utterly stupid CIA-engineered coup against Sihanouk did just as much damage, probably.

The coup didn't help, to be sure, but "50,000 to 150,000 at minimum" is an awful wide basement for such tallies. I'd be interested to know the source for such information.

But, of course, the Transvaal did have enormous strategic significance in 1900. There had been recent discoveries of gold and diamonds there and they held enormous amounts of wealth.

Gladstone gave the two Boer republics their independence in the 1880s when they were little more than a collection of farms.

By the late 1890s, Joseph Chamberlain, Alfred Milner, Cecil Rhodes and others were deeply regretting that decision. That's when they began to try and interfere in Boer politics (e.g., Jameson Raid).

As some people said above, the Boer War was a lot more than a simple colonial misadventure.

Regardless of what happens after we leave Iraq, we should have had the benefit of hindsight given what happened in Vietnam. The fact that our leaders and opinion drivers were so negligent and internalize this bitterly-earned wisdom is perhaps the greatest tragedy of this whole sordid debacle.

If certain people weren't so vain and hell-bent to obfuscate the real reasons why Vietnam was such a failure, we never would have allowed anything similar to happen again. Maybe, at long last, we'll learn our lesson: nobody will fight a conventional war against us, which is the only kind of war we (or any military superpower) can decisively win.

Regarding civilian deaths from bombing in Cambodia. 150,000 is a very low estimate. Many other historians see the upper end at 600,000.

Ben Kiernan at Yale pegs this figure. He is an excellent scholar of the Pol Pot era and the genocide. The 50k-150k estimate is from his own research. Again, given the new evidence this is very likely an extremely lowball figure.

http://www.yale.edu/cgp/us.html

I have trouble believing that 10% of the population was wiped out by the bombing campaign, which was concentrated (if not, as the map shows, exclusively) in less-populated zones. And it does bear repeating that the NVA opted to use Eastern Cambodia as a supply line.

As I've noted elsewhere, the best analogy I can think of is the Soviet-Afghan conflict (http://therightoutlaw.blogspot.com/2007/04/lessons-learned-by-red-army.html), the key difference being that we were funding the Mujahideen and it came back to bite us in the end. Of course, one can easily imagine ways that a resulting failed state in Iraq in the aftermath of an American withdrawal would endanger US security.

Maybe, at long last, we'll learn our lesson: nobody will fight a conventional war against us, which is the only kind of war we (or any military superpower) can decisively win.

Oh, please. We can win an anti-insurgency campaign (and have won them in the past) - all it requires is will and persistence, as well as learning the lessons from previous such campaigns (which we seem to do fitfully, to be sure). The only reason we have trouble with guerrilla wars is because the press has a romanticized version of communist guerrillas as some sort of invincible warrior, and run around shrieking that we are losing before a war even gets started (see, NYTimes prior to the Afghan war). That, and the fact that a large fraction of the Democratic party is pacifist in nature, and actively fights against any use of military force.

AC - First of all, 150,000 is not 10% of a population of 25m. Refugee flows are 2m, which is about 12% of the populace.

Mike S. - Seriously, the only reason we have problems with guerrilla wars are (1) press coverage and (2) Democrats? That would be funny if it weren't quite so deliberately stupid.

Tequila
I was referring to the high-end figure of 600K that you gave for the death toll from the Cambodian bombing. Of a population measured at roughly 6 million in 1970 that would be 10%.

A couple of points:
1) The war in Vietnam diverted Soviet and Chinese attention away from other potential targets. Many experts on Southeast Asia acknowledge that other countries in the region are far more democratic and capitalistic than they might have been if the Vietnam War had not given them time to emerge in their present incarnation.
2) I question the premise (by Larison) that Wilson was responsible for so much devastation in Europe. How exactly can the blame be laid on him? If Wilson had done nothing, if the U.S. had remained uninvolved in WWI, would things have been more positive for Europe? And Wilson failed in his quest for the League of Nations to be ratified in the U.S. - if he had succeeded, would it really have made much of a difference?

Mike S. - Seriously, the only reason we have problems with guerrilla wars are (1) press coverage and (2) Democrats? That would be funny if it weren't quite so deliberately stupid.

The primary advantage guerrillas have is support from part of the local population, and the lack of will on the part of those they are fighting against, since by definition they have fewer resources than the government/large power. That is, they depend upon perceptions in order to remain viable. If the population turns on them, they cannot survive; if the large power (e.g. the US) has the will to stick it out, they cannot survive. A significant component of whether the local population supports them is the perceptions about what the large power will do. The media tends to glamorize the insurgents, and doesn't do a very good job of reporting on their losses and ideology. But they give saturation coverage to any losses the big power sustains, and any mistakes they make. The Democratic party, over the past 40 years, has regularly sent the signal that they have no stomach for fighting, and would prefer to withdraw/talk/appease the insurgency. In the absence of both of these phenomena, we would have much less trouble dealing with guerilla warfare.

Bernard Lewis backs me up.

cheap@giag.com

Hard to compare it to the Boer war yes theirs a guerrilla war but they have not burned the farms and put the Iraqis in constration camps. What kind of people would do that?

Hard to compare it to the Boer war yes theirs a guerrilla war but they have not burned the farms and put the Iraqis in constration camps. What kind of people would do that?