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Talent on the Military

16 May 2007 12:28 pm

Regarding my earlier post on whether we should increase the size of the military, Jim Talent writes in:

Ross Douthat ... disagrees with my claim (in the March 5, 2007, National Review) that the Army should be larger. He asserts that the Army would be adequately sized already if not for the nation building exercise in Iraq, which he does not support. I don’t begrudge him or anyone their discontent with the Iraqi operation but I would point out the following:


1. The National Military Strategy (NMS) is the government’s official evaluation of our military requirements. The current NMS, dating back to the Clinton years, requires a military capable of defending the homeland, sustaining four peacekeeping engagements, and fighting two large-scale regional conflicts at approximately the same time.

As far as I know, no one has questioned the validity of these requirements. Given the potential flashpoints in North Korea, Taiwan, and the Middle East, the global war on terror, the situation in Darfur, and the ethnic and regional rivalries around the world, America could easily face two substantial combat operations at almost the same time. In addition, the military must perform various peacekeeping obligations, as well as the day-to-day homeland defenses, intelligence and patrol obligations of the military. In my judgment, the NMS should be updated to include nation building and anti-guerrilla responsibilities because -- regardless of the wisdom of the current operation in Iraq -- those are capabilities which experience shows we need in the post cold war world. America built a democracy and fought guerrillas in Bosnia. The mission in Afghanistan requires both capabilities. If Saddam Hussein had actually possessed an active nuclear program, there would presumably be a consensus that the war in Iraq was the right thing to do -- 77 Senators voted for the war on precisely that assumption -- yet the Army would be having many of the same problems it is having now, because it did not possess the right organic capabilities from the beginning.

2. My larger point was that, even under the current NMS -- even assuming America should never build a democracy or fight guerrillas anywhere -- the Army is too small. A 10-division Army is not capable of fighting two major regional wars like Desert Storm at the same time, much less fight two such wars while carrying on the other missions called for in the NMS.

Washington has known the Army is undersized since 1993. In House Armed Services Subcommittee Hearings that year, recently retired Army Chiefs of Staffs tore to shreds the idea that a 10-division force was adequate. I was on that Subcommittee, and the man who chaired it -- Ike Skelton -- currently chairs the full House Armed Services Committee. Representative Skelton agreed with the things the Chiefs said.

Mr. Douthat, like all Americans, is entitled to ask how official Washington, under two Presidents and several Congresses controlled by both Parties, could have gotten such vital issues so wrong for so many years. The answer is that, once the Cold War ended, budgetary considerations were consistently allowed to trump the clear needs of national security. That is why so many defense experts are now calling for substantial increases in the Army and the defense budget and also for a requirement that at least four percent of the GDP be devoted to the national defense for the foreseeable future. Those changes won’t affect the operation in Iraq, but they could well be vital to the success of American foreign policy -- whatever it is and whoever is running it -- for decades to come.

I appreciate the former Senator's response. Regardless of the merits of the two regional-wars posture, though, I remain skeptical that it's even possible to maintain such a posture with an all-volunteer military, given the recruitment and training challenges we face already. Recall that Desert Storm, which Talent cites as an example of a "regional" conflict, involved 500,000 U.S. troops; he's right that we couldn't fight two Gulf Wars at once with the current Army, but it seems to me unlikely that recruitment alone with enable us to make up the difference. It's true that the Army was larger in the Reagan era than today, but that Army was recruiting in peacetime; today's recruits, by contrast, know that they're signing up for war, and there are fewer of them as a result. As I suggested in my earlier post, I think that advocates of the "two regional wars" posture haven't grappled sufficiently with this quandary, and I think the logic of their position suggests that what America needs now is a draft.

Comments (8)

The bind this puts folks like Talent in is that, were a draft reinstated, it'd be his kids who are sent off to Iraq. I don't want to make assumptions, there are folks in Washington who walk the walk and instill a virtue of service in their kids that leads them into the military. I think that there are serious pressures in Washington, though, that tempt public officials into joining a class of folks whose kids just don't have to fight, because we are able (with the help of technology and the markets) to protect them from, like, the world.

It seems to me that going off to get shot at, in our culture, only makes sense if it's a risk you're willing to take for a profit. Talent is much more likely to suggest raising the base salary of troops in a hostile environment to private-contractor levels than to support something like a draft. It might not get us to 500,000, bur it may well increase our ability to scatter way more targets around the world, if you'll pardon my bleakness.

I think that advocates of the "two regional wars" posture haven't grappled sufficiently with this quandary, and I think the logic of their position suggests that what America needs now is a draft.

Very true. Just as social programs are more popular than the taxes that pay for them, military force projection is much more popular than the draft that is necessary to maintain such a policy.

More to the point, advocates of the "we need a larger military" posture haven't grappled sufficiently with the glaring disconnect between their strategic aims (more personnel and equipment for peacekeeping missions and large regional wars against rogue nations) and the DoD's spending habits (contractor pork like nuclear submarines, stealth aircraft, and other big-ticket hardware that would only be necessary for fighting a non-existent rival superpower.)

I'd suggest that this disconnect has a great deal to do with most of the "we need a larger military" cheerleaders being employed by the defense industry and the think tanks they sponsor, but that would be rude.

Mr. Douthat,

I am a doctoral student in security studies at MIT, and an admirer of both your work and Jim Talent's, at least as regards his views on domestic issues. On this matter, you are right and he is wrong. The two major theater wars standard was a standard invented by the military in order to justify substantially smaller "peace dividend" budget cuts than would have otherwise occurred. Other requirements (4-2-1-1) have been added for much the same reasons--to justify current and planned force structure for political purposes.

Even under assumptions, which I consider fallacious, that America needs to be able to fight and win two major theater conventional wars simultaneously, there is no reason to believe this cannot be done with ten divisions. To begin with, the presumption would have to be that we would start on the defensive in both places. There is no reason why we could not hold the line on the tactical defensive in one location, a task the modern army perfected during the cold war, while rolling up opposition forces in the other, and then shifting theaters (this is often referred to as win-hold-win in defense parlance). Second, no armored force can hold a candle to us in a conventional fight, even under favorable assumptions about terrain and training of the opposition. It would cost us casualties, to be sure, but this is presumably an interest worth the price.

In point of fact, it would be prudent to re-examine these assumptions that were generated for bureaucratic purposes. The scenarios the Two MTW metric were designed for were a conventional attack by Iraq and one by North Korea. Iraq we have eliminated as a conventional threat, and North Korea's army is aged, poorly equipped, and will not cause us much trouble in the extremely unlikely event it came across the DMZ. Where else are we going suffer a conventional war? The only armies out there worth fighting are owned by the Europeans. The time of conventional war is passing, and in the small chance one might occur, we would be dominant with the military we have.

Peacekeeping is more tricky--as you correctly point out, the major requirements for peacekeeping and Counter-insurgency are manpower. A strategy for doing lots of such activities would require a massive increase in the size of our ground forces, though very little of the procurement that Senator Talent recommends. Given the resistance to a draft and the inherent difficulties of such operations, it seems far wiser to avoid them than to plan our army around them.

In short, America would be best served with a Grand Strategy that limited our liability, and a highly efficient military that reflected that strategy. I consider it deeply unfortunate that Mr. Talent lost his race against Senator McCaskill in the last election cycle. However, given that much of that cycle was centered around inane republican foreign and defense policy, Senator Talent's views are evidence that the blow was not unjust.

If we put more money into recruitment and pay for the military, then we would see better results in recruitment & retention. If we had a bigger Army, the deployments to Iraq & Afghanistan would not be as frequent or as long, again making recruitment easier. It might become necessary to institute a draft at some point, but we aren't there yet.

Both LaFollette & Brendan are ignoring the value of deterrence. If we have a smaller armed forces, and various enemies figure out that we cannot handle two simultaneous regional conflicts, then the chances that we will face such an occurrence rise. The 1970's and 1990's provide ample evidence that when America doesn't robustly project force, our enemies make trouble in various ways. Precisely because of our overwhelming technological superiority, we are likely to be faced primarily with low-intensity conflict such as we are dealing with in Afghanistan and Iraq. But we don't really have the option of avoiding such fights, given the combination of Islamism, terrorism, and WMDs.

"I have a credential" arguments are deeply unpersuasive.

No, we don't need a draft. Our entire military force structure, our grand strategies and our tactics, are built around having an all-volunteer army--more skilled, more courageous, and, politically, more deployable than a draft army. Add 100K draftees to our army, and our military ability declines in absolute terms. It's only worth having a draft if you double or triple the total size of the armed forces--and that will still require a rethink of every aspect of US military doctine to implement properly.

We could use a lot more money directed at the pay of officers and enlisted men, to increase the quantity and quality of our volunteer armed forces. But a draft we need like a hole in the head.

I don't particularly think that we need the sort of men under arms we had during the Cold War (say, circa 1984 or something) but why, exactly, couldn't we do that again?

We could. But it would cost money, some component of which would very likely involve raising taxes. If the political constituency for hiking taxes to pay for the military were larger than Joe Lieberman, John McCain, and their close personal friends, we'd be in clover. But it ain't--not this year, anyway. Check back in January 2009.

Mike S. -- "The 1970's and 1990's provide ample evidence that when America doesn't robustly project force, our enemies make trouble in various ways. Precisely because of our overwhelming technological superiority, we are likely to be faced primarily with low-intensity conflict such as we are dealing with in Afghanistan and Iraq."

This gets to the heart of my disagreement with Talent. Every word written above is true, but half the story is missing. The 1980s and 2000s provide ample evidence that when America DOES robustly project force, our enemies also make trouble in various ways, specifically ways that end up with dead and maimed soldiers and foreign civilians, angry and uncooperative allies, resentment that feeds into terrorist recruitment, etc. Also, our enemies have clearly shown the limits of our ability to use a small, high-tech army to impose our will. We can smash armies and infrastructure and sow chaos, but we can't defeat insurrections or build a new, more favorable order.

There is a deliberate and fundamental blindness to these weaknesses in the standard narrative of military force projection.

Dramatically downsizing the US military or putting military R&D on hold would clearly be naive. But erring in the opposite direction isn't working so well, either. And, as I've pointed out, the resources our military actually needs to carry out the Bush Doctrine (more infantry divisions) aren't what the defense lobbyists are actually promoting (joint strike fighters, missile subs, and other assorted pork).