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Reihan: Ideological Conservatism

05 Oct 2007 04:04 pm

While reading David Brooks terrific column on the creedalization of American conservatism, I thought to myself, "Self, is creedalization so bad?" I'm not so sure.

To my mind, Ideology per se isn't the problem: we all use frameworks and heuristics to understand the world. And creeds have value. The trouble comes when they calcify. That is the value of coalition politics, and the creative tension coalition politics engenders. Yuval Levin puts this extremely well in a smart critique of the Brooks column:

Brooks applies his abstract critique of abstractions to essentially all the threads of the conservative program of recent years. He says that social conservatives are not Burkean enough because they seek a politics of applied principles, and that libertarians are not Burkean enough because they pursue excessive individualism, and that neoconservatives are not Burkean enough because they think societies can be reformed at will.

But to some extent surely these criticisms of each conservative strand answer one another. Social conservatives believe deeply (at times surely excessively) in precisely the kind of social cohesion and unity Brooks finds so lacking in individualist libertarians.

Libertarians, in turn, push against the excesses of social conservatism and refuse to abide a politics of theological abstractions. And the neoconservatives, finally, have been from the beginning concerned with culture on the one hand and with data and empiricism on the other. Their belief in the importance of a culture’s internal institutions, and in the notion that over long spans political reform can help spur cultural reform, are hardly the stuff of the French Revolution.

To be sure, I tend to think US conservatives get the balance wrong. I'm thus far more sympathetic to blue-green "Cameron Conservatism," and to Europe's Christian Democratic traditions.

Late last year, I wrote a longish post on Christianism and Christian Democracy that I was kind of a fragment of a reaction to Andrew Sullivan's important critique of creedal conservatism, The Conservative Soul. (Let me just preface by saying that there are few things lamer than quoting yourself, but this will save me some paraphrasing.)

So is Christian Democracy, a particular kind of big-government conservatism that embraces the welfare state for purposes of Christian-inspired "soulcraft," in fact best understood as the Contintental variant of Christianism?

If so, I think Christianism has suddenly become far less objectionable. Why? Well, when you look at postwar Europe, the humane Christian Democratic politics of a Konrad Adenauer were crucial to combating the twin demons of fascism and communism. By drawing on the shared ethical tradition of Catholics and Protestants, big-tent Christian Democratic parties helped legitimate market economies by softening the (alleged) rough edges of laissez-faire.

Now, it's obvious that evangelical and fundamentalist Protestantism are very different from the Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism that defined the Christian Democratic movement of Germany, and certainly from the Christian Democratic movements of southern Europe that have splintered into movements of the center-left, center-right, and far-right. But it's safe to say that this political tendency represented the "fusion of political ideology and religious faith." And I think it was a healthy and constructive part of European public discourse.

It could be that America's Christian Democrats -- or rather, America's Christianists -- are uniquely poisonous and dangerous. But then that's less a necessary function of this political fusion than of other factors, including perhaps the cronyism and corruption of the particular Christianists Sullivan and Stuttaford have in mind.

I still think this is roughly right. Of course, this is kind of an awkward position to take. "I think Bushian conservatism is totally bankrupt. But wait ... I don't think it's bankrupt as a matter of principle." The danger is that you look like an apologist for something you emphatically reject, and I strongly argued for Bush's defeat as early as 2003. And yet there's a danger on the other side: that you let some decent ideas be exclusively claimed by people who are fundamentally corrupt and incompetent.

Comments (6)

You're every bit as right now as you were in November, 2006. Likewise, now as then, the people you're critiquing -- in this case, David Brooks -- are being, for lack of a better term, elusive in their language and critcisms.

As a long-time critic of the Christian-GOP alliance, I'm tempted to think that my co-religionists are being hoist on their own petard when people like Brooks position to make them the fall guys for the upcoming Republic electoral debacle. It's not as though they weren't warned that something like this was likely.

Still, I can't do it. Brooks' blaming conservatism's troubles on Christians "creedalizing" conservatism is comical. There's little wrong, at least electorally, with "conservatism" (whatever that means) that not having invaded Iraq and some basic competence at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue wouldn't have averted.

There is nothing at all conservative about creedalization / propositionalism. It was born of the left-wing Enlightenment, and strongly criticized by the likes of Burke and De Maistre. In fact, the entire 19th-century conservative tradition was built upon criticizing such abstractions.

Real conservatives support the older concept of a patria: one rooted in kith and kin, and genophilia (instinctive attachment to family and tribe). This older type of nation has been tested by time (over 10,000 years), and it is in fact the default arrangement. Even Greek democracy and Roman republicanism were built upon tribal systems.

I think Burke's jeremiads against abstractionism have been misunderstood both by his defenders and his detractors. The kind of abstraction he was referring to was that defended by the Jacobins - abstract natural rights divorced from any historical context, strong emphases on freedom and equality as concepts, etc. This kind of theorizing leads to a notion of one universally acceptable political arrangement without which all polities are fundamentally unjust. Obviously this was anathema to Burke.

On the other hand, there is good reason to think that Burke believed in a doctrine of natural law, such as has been defended throughout Christian history. A natural moral law (with moral prescriptions presumed to be inherent in our nature) is certainly "creedal", and to some extent abstract; but it could conceivably be applied to various kinds of political orders, and need not offend against indigenous traditions in quite the same way as liberal abstractionism does. There are of course limits, though; obviously if your political traditions depend upon some grievous violation of that law, then those traditions need to be changed.

Still, I think there are perfectly good ways of harmonizing a Burkean suspicion of abstraction with "creedalization".

"And the neoconservatives, finally, have been from the beginning concerned with culture on the one hand and with data and empiricism on the other."

The problem with the neoconservatives is that they stopped being concerned with data and empiricism. They started out four decades ago as domestically-oriented social scientists but the second generation turned out to be foreign policy-oriented ideologues. Irving Kristol crunched more numbers on an adding machine than Bill Kristol has crunched on a Pentium chip. Charles Murray is practically the last number cruncher left among the neoconservatives.

"Real conservatives support the older concept of a patria: one rooted in kith and kin, and genophilia (instinctive attachment to family and tribe). This older type of nation has been tested by time (over 10,000 years), and it is in fact the default arrangement. Even Greek democracy and Roman republicanism were built upon tribal systems."

"Kinism" is a radical concept. Such a view neglects Burkes's Whiggish, institutional side. George Washington certainly had strong roots and respect for tradition, but he wasn't a tribalist. American conservatives can be against increased centralization all they want, but we should recognize conservatism's role in getting beyond tribalism and simple rejection of change. Maybe what it comes down to is whether one is always "either/or" or can appreciate the "both/and" side of politics.

Burke was opposed to the French Revolution, when many thought it was a good idea. Out of the French Revolution rose Napoleon, who at first only
attacked British shipping and ultimately ended up in a ground war with the Brits in Holland, and Naval confrontations off the Spanish coast.