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How Many Divisions Have the Europeans?

28 Nov 2007 05:28 pm

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A few days ago, Mark Steyn had this to say about the American military presence in Old Europe:

Absolved of the core responsibility of sovereign jurisdictions - defense of the realm - Europe decayed, almost inevitably, into a kind of semi-non-aligned status, and persuaded itself that it had developed a higher model of nationhood, not realizing that its lavish social programs were, in effect, subsidized by the Pentagon. This has been bad for Europe - and bad for America, too, in that most of the Democratic Party would like to introduce the European model here, apparently unaware that it depends on a strong America to render it viable.

The Continentals are so insulated from reality they don't even value the US presence in strategic terms. German politicians speak of US military bases mainly as an economic issue - all those German supermarkets and German restaurants that depend on American custom. At the risk of igniting old controversies, the Continentals are the defense equivalents of those wealthy S-CHIP families: They would function better as adult nations if they had to accept the responsibilities of adulthood.

This is, I think, a very interesting geopolitical question: To what extent would Europe re-arm if America suddenly stopped garrisoning the continent? I think Steyn is right that the European model - small military, big welfare state - was originally rendered viable by the U.S. military presence. But I'm not sure that's true any more, now that the Cold War is over and the old national rivalries have given way to an end-of-history moment. What "responsibilities of adulthood" would Germany, for instance, suddenly feel compelled to take on if the U.S. closed its bases? A Franco-German arms race seem pretty unlikely; so does a sudden push to re-arm against the Polish menace to the east. Putin's Russia is a slightly-more-plausible catalyst for continental rearmament, but only by comparison with the alternatives. Moreover, if you look at defense spending around the world, countries like Germany and its neighbors are already spending much more on their militaries than many nations that live in rougher neighborhoods and don't have the U.S. to look out for them. (The much-mocked Italians, for instance, spend more on defense than Turkey, Israel and Iran put together.) It's awfully hard to imagine the absence of American troops from European soil would cause those expenditures to rise much higher.

What's more plausible, I think - so plausible that I'm just cribbing the argument from lots of other people - is that the overall rate of U.S. spending on defense (rather than the location of our garrisons) is so high and so unmatchable that it drives defense spending down for everybody else (not just the Western Europeans). If you can't compete with the hyperpower, why bother trying? (Especially when you can count on fear of the hyperpower's military to prevent the kind of large-scale cross-border attacks that used to be common, and have now all but disappeared.) The Pentagon's budget isn't just subsidizing Europe; it's subsidizing the whole world. And this would be true no matter where we stationed our troops.

Photo by Flickr user klika100 used under a Creative Commons license.

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Comments (21)

Raw numbers means less than defense spending as a percentage of GDP. With just raw numbers, there's no way at all to tell whether countries are spending less money because they just don't attach as much importance to it, or because they just have a smaller pool to draw from.

There is a huge difference between 2% defense spending on a trillion dollar GDP and 10% defense spending on a hundred billion dollar GDP, even though in dollar amounts its the same.

Your conclusion may still be true, but arguing from only overall spending figures is fallacious. Perhaps Germany and its neighbors are only spending more money because they have better economies and tax bases to start with, and the other countries will end up spending much more than Germany when their economy finally comes within the same per capita GDP range.

The Europeans (French, British, Germans) should be able and willing 1) to defend the Baltic States, Belarus, and Ukraine from Russia; 2) police the Balkans; 3) maintain naval supremacy in the Mediterranean vis-a-vis their southern and eastern neighbors. They may not need to spend at American levels to achieve these goals, but I gather they need to spend more than they do now.

Defend Ukraine and Belarus?? That's insane. Culturally, politically, economically and historically those countries have always been dominated by Moscow. Just like the US would not let any foreign government dominate Mexico or Canada, Belarus and the Ukraine should remain within the Russian sphere of influence.

The EU already has more than enough resources to police the Balkans if they restructured the military, and their navies have no competitors in the Mediterranean (if the Americans left).

The fact is virtually all of Europe's neighbors are woefully weak in military terms. E.g. Morocco and Tunisia have really small armies so they do not pose a threat even to Spain, let alone to the EU as a whole. The only Islamic country in the near Middle East with reasonably strong military is Turkey, which anyway is part of NATO.

Another fact is Britain and France *still* have some of the world's strongest armed forces in both relative and absolute terms, despite of course lagging way behind the U.S.. I see no logical reason why Europe needs to waste as much money on defense as the United States does, though. What would we need it for -- invade Iraq or something??

Steyn's a clueless asshole and easily one of the worst conservative pundits out there.


MARCU$

Agreed, Europe's current military strength is perfectly adequete to its needs even if you subtract America from the picture. The problem isn't lack of military spending, it's lack of political will and coordination, as we saw in the 90s as Yugoslavia fell apart. Getting the EU to agree on when and where the Europeans should actually use their militaries is like herding cats. And yes, there certainly is an attitude of "Let America do it".

Agreed, Europe's current military strength is perfectly adequete to its needs even if you subtract America from the picture. The problem isn't lack of military spending, it's lack of political will and coordination, as we saw in the 90s as Yugoslavia fell apart. Getting the EU to agree on when and where the Europeans should actually use their militaries is like herding cats. And yes, there certainly is an attitude of "Let America do it".

The better metric of how much a country is committed to its military defense is probably some sort of capabilities metric. On that score, most of Europe does very poorly - they're just unable to project any sort of military force on their own for any length of time. Without American logistical support, really only France could do much of anything (maybe Britain as well). But there's a good reason for that - they don't really have any localized conventional threats and, as Ross notes, whatever distance threats there are (say, China threatening trade routes in Asia) they feel assured the Americans will take care of things. I mean, who's going to mount an invasion of the EU? Even the Russians are hardly a real threat - whatever little toys Putin can buy with his petrodollars, he's still running a very sick country. Even if the Americans left, I doubt the Europeans would worry much more about defense - we would just lose some forward-operating bases and another lever of influence in the continent.

What "responsibilities of adulthood" would Germany, for instance, suddenly feel compelled to take on if the U.S. closed its bases? A Franco-German arms race seem pretty unlikely; so does a sudden push to re-arm against the Polish menace to the east. Putin's Russia is a slightly-more-plausible catalyst for continental rearmament, but only by comparison with the alternatives.

Isn't this whole argument academic? What conceivable military threat would a) menace Europe but b) not concern the United States? Let's say US troops leave Europe entirely. If the Russian economy takes off, and Russia uses the money to rearm and threaten Europe, US troops will return to defend the Continent. If Germany, in a fit of nostalgia for the early 20th century, suddenly rearms and begins threatening its neighbors, US troops will return to defend the Continent.

It's not like the US garrisoned Western Europe during the Cold War because Americans are such nice people. The US has a strategic interest in not seeing Europe and Asia dominated by a competing superpower, or devastated by competition between rival regional powers. Part of that involves making sure the large economies and relatively high populations of Western Europe don't build correspondingly strong and large armies and navies.

Using the vocabularies of morality, altruism and self-improvement to describe international relations is silly. It seems like Steyn's just crying in his imperialist beer because other countries get to free-ride on America's quest for global dominance. Boo-hoo.

Steyn's argument is that because of Europe's "free-ride", they have taken a decidedly immature attitude towards global issues. "Let America do it" is not a mature attitude. Appeasing threats is not a mature attitude. This has made many members of the EU military light-weights, and too dependent on U.S. military for NATO missions. Or even to eliminate the military aspect of NATO military missions.

It's a valid point that Europeans could stand to be more aware of the extent to which their modern welfare states are the product of US military expenditures (at least past expenditures, maybe not current expenditures). At the same time, though, I don't see why their approach to foreign policy is less "mature" than the United States'.

If the US wants to dominate the world's sea lanes, dominate the world's energy supply, garrison hundreds of thousands of troops around the world, etc., and if its pursuit of global hegemony is either good for Europe or doesn't affect Europe one way or the other, why should Europeans build large armies and navies and send them to far-off places? Just to prove to Steyn that they're all growed up?

And, while American foreign policy is objectively more aggressive than European foreign policy, I don't think it's objectively more mature. The United States is much more willing than Europe to involve itself in areas where its vital interests aren't plausibly at stake. That can have positive and negative consequences. The United States is also much more willing to pick fights and to see "threats" that may or may not exist. It's not appeasement if nothing's really at stake (as, for example, nothing was at stake in our quest to save the world from Saddam Hussein's mythical nuclear weapons program).

In any case, does Steyn really want a Europe full of heavily-armed states looking to throw their weight around? The historical precedents aren't promising.

JB, Steyn would proabably pull out his boilerplate arguments, and substitute 'Eurofascism' for 'Islamofascism' or 'Iraqifascism' or 'Iranianfascism'. It's all easy for the neoconmen.

Michael Simpson: "The better metric of how much a country is committed to its military defense is probably some sort of capabilities metric. On that score, most of Europe does very poorly - they're just unable to project any sort of military force on their own for any length of time. "

Methinks that you're confusing 'capabilities' with 'projection ability'. The second is Europe's weakness, and has been since, oh, 1945. For obvious historical reasons.

To Ross, and others - the obvious way for various European countries to build up strength in the event of a US withdrawal to another dimension (or something) is to build up strong nuclear capabilities. Especially if facing a resurgent Russia, that would be the only practical thing to do.

To Ross, and others - the obvious way for various European countries to build up strength in the event of a US withdrawal to another dimension (or something) is to build up strong nuclear capabilities.

France and the UK already have the third and fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Between the both of them, they probably have more than enough Nukes to render the Planet inhabitable.

The only realistic military threat the Europeans face is each other and the US.

When I was a pickaninny, we had wonderful movies like "The Mouse That Roared". That is what is needed- Andorra or Lichtenstein to not just go nuclear, but raise the stakes with the Tritium Bomb or some such. The problem is, Europe has given up Mass Slaughter because they got bored (or maybe horrified) with it. That only leaves Outsiders to pick up the baton. China- no hope. No matter how muscular their rise, no nation with a generation of only children will risk a personal End of History. Thank you, Chairman Mao. Guess who that leaves?

The small military-high welfare is also, to some extent, inaccurate. Several European countries have very large militaries based on conscription (hence part of the resistance to deploying them) that were designed to fight the Cold War or are legacies (as in Spain) of a Fascist state. The only countries that have reformed their militaries to be more modern, volunteer forces are France and Britain: those are the two most interventionist states in Europe.

Europe doesn't need more soldiers, but less and more spending.

Incidentally the idea that Europe got a free ride in the Cold War is patent nonsense. Every German, Italian, French and Spanish young man (to name a few) were conscripted in armies whose almost only purpose was to fight the Soviets. Sweden and some other Scandinavians still have conscript armies that train in defence against a potential Russian attack.

Incidentally the idea that Europe got a free ride in the Cold War is patent nonsense. Every German, Italian, French and Spanish young man (to name a few) were conscripted in armies whose almost only purpose was to fight the Soviets. Sweden and some other Scandinavians still have conscript armies that train in defence against a potential Russian attack.

Good point. The United States spends huge sums of money to ensure that it can project military power anywhere in the world (multiple carrier battle groups, airborne units that can deploy anywhere in the world on short-notice, bombers with global range, cruise missiles that can travel thousands of miles, etc.) Even countries that commit a lot of money, manpower and technology to fielding outstanding armies are going to look like lightweights in comparison. Making it very difficult to invade your own country is a lot cheaper than building a military you hope is capable of crippling and/or invading any country on earth.

Steyn's weak-kneed, Islamized, on the verge of collapse Europe, like the "wealthy S-CHIP families" he cites, just doesn't exist. As numerous folks have pointed out, the EU sustains a high level of military investment and has not real need to build its ability to project power much beyond its borders. You seem like a reasonable guy Ross, you should know better than to treat this clown with even a minimum of seriousness.

In order to have a "mature" and responsible foreign policy, Europe needs to be able to project military power. Two words: Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.

Back in 2004, then SACEUR Gen. James Jones was quoted by BBC to the effect that continental military forces were "less than 10% usefully deployable". I'm one who believes this is in no one's interest except rogue states, and needs to change.

Re: In order to have a "mature" and responsible foreign policy, Europe needs to be able to project military power.


Nonsense. By that standard only the US is able to have a "mature and responmsible foreign policy" as even Russia and China are not able to project military power much beyond their immediate neighborhoods. Of course what you probably mean by this is a foreign policy that consists of bullying other nations.
As for your examples the Europeans certainly could have handled Yugoslavia (the French for example have no trouble with deployments of exactly that sort in Africa). The problem, for which Europe may indeed be blamed, is that the will was lacking.

The primary result of a unified European foreign policy and larger European armies would be military competition with the United States. Who else is there to compete with? That's why the Americans oppose a militarily stronger Europe and piss all over the French when they get uppity.

And why should any country spend money and risk lives to do things the United States--with a military and a foreign policy geared towards global dominance--will do anyway? That's not weak or naive; in fact it goes well beyond "mature" and into the realm of the cold-blooded.

What vital national interest should have compelled France and Germany to send troops into the Balkans in the early 90s, or into Afghanistan in 2001 (when the US had made it more than clear that it would be doing all the heavy lifting)? And why would it be "mature" for Europe to maintain larger armies for the purpose of sending them wherever the United States decides they should go?

It's also not clear that having large armies would be very useful in dealing with rogue states. Nobody's going to invade Iran any time soon. Any invasion of North Korea would result in the destruction of South Korea, which is why the South Koreans oppose it and why it will never happen.

Finally, if the ability to project military power is a sign of maturity, the United States is in an immature phase. The American military's commitment in Iraq has made it virtually un-deployable anywhere else in the world on any useful scale. It's too busy a) Defeating a terrorist organization that is only active in Iraq because of the US invasion, and b) Working to limit the consequences of massive Iranian infiltration of Iraq's territory, security forces and government, which is also a consequence of the US invasion.

In other words, reliance on a military solution has strengthened America's two most formidable adversaries in the Arab/Islamic worlds: al Qaeda and Iran. That in itself is a lesson in the dangers of conflating military power with maturity or good sense.

"Bullying other nations" is exactly what a mature foreign policy stands against, and in an increasingly interconnected world, Europe has just as much interest in a reasonably stable international order as any other major player--more than most.

It is true that Europe could have "handled" Yugoslavia, and might have done so if the French weren't, as usual, on the side of fascism, and everyone else except the Brits paralyzed by their lack of capacity. Having "large armies" is probably not very useful. But having highly mobile and effective ones is a really good idea in a world of the future that will almost surely have less of a free ride in security matters from the US taxpayers.

m (first post) is right, spending as a percentage of GDP is what matters. Italy may spend more on defense than Israel, Turkey, and Iran combined in net terms, but of course this mostly because the funds are less scarce in Italy than in Israel, Turkey, and Iran combined.

Note that Israel (6th), Turkey (17th), and Iran (66th) are all far above Italy (91st) when ranked by expenditure-over-GDP, according to the CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html . Surely this has something to do with the danger of armed conflict being higher for I/T/I than for Italy.

It seems likely that if US garrisons pulled out, defense would suddenly become more important to nations like Italy and thus worth more of the tax pie.

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