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Taking the Bait

06 May 2008 04:45 pm

Daniel Larison wants to know what I make of this passage, which kicks off Damon Linker's review of Charles Marash's Wayward Christian Soldiers: Freeing the Gospel From Political Captivity:

Who would now deny that the political ascendancy of the religious right has been bad for the United States? Its destructive consequences are plain for all to see. It has polarized the nation. It has injected theological certainties into public life. It has led political leaders to invest their aims and their deeds with metaphysical significance. It has made America a laughingstock in the eyes of the educated of the world. And it has encouraged devout believers to think of themselves as agents of the divine, and their political opponents as enemies of God.

I hesitate to dignify the deeply irritating "all reasonable people must agree with the self-evident truth of my argument" trope with a rejoinder, but since Daniel asks ... well, look, obviously if you disagree with the religious right's various policy objectives, you'll think that its rise ("ascendancy" seems like a little much, doesn't it?) has been bad for the United States. That's a perfectly reasonable position to take. But it isn't what Linker's arguing here. The "destructive consequences" he's talking about all seem to have to do with the nature of our political culture, not the shape of our public policies - specifically, the level of polarization, moral absolutism, and us-versus-them Manichaeism in American political life, with the damage to our reputation among "the educated of the world" thrown in for good measure.

On the last point, I imagine Linker could find some polling data to back up his argument, though I'm also pretty sure that European sophisticates were wont to look down their noses at American rubes long before Pat Robertson came along. As for the rest of his claims, the available evidence seems to run the other way. Perhaps Linker has a different timeline in mind, but I would date the modern religious right's rise to the late 1970s, and I would urge anyone who honestly believes that the level of polarization, absolutism, and Manichaean excess has risen in our politics since the Seventies to read Rick Perlstein's Nixonland and reconsider. The parties have grown more polarized vis-a-vis one another since then, true, but our politics in general have grown vastly more peaceful, even as arguments over civil rights and Vietnam have given way to arguments over issues like abortion and gay marriage. Which ought to suggest, at the very least, that there's no easy correlation to be drawn between the influence of religion on democratic politics and the tendency of democratic peoples toward division, self-righteousness and violence.

One could, of course, dispute the premise that the politics of the Sixties and the early Seventies were any less flavored by theological concerns and metaphysical yearnings than the era that followed; indeed, I would be inclined to dispute it myself. But that still doesn't provide any grounds for claiming that the religious right "injected" theology into politics in some uniquely destructive way. Rather, it suggests that what Linker sees as an alien and destructive innovation - religious conservatism's intermingling of politics and metaphysics - is actually a more or less constant feature of American life, and one whose consequences for civil order and national unity have been far less dire during the post-'70s culture war than in the supposedly-more-secular era that preceded it.

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Comments (61)

I'd like to issue a temporary moratorium on the word "trope."

Thanks in advance.

In the '60's and '70's, you had a massive welfare state, a war that was getting a lot of American kids killed, and mass social upheaval (including both the civil rights movement, and the rise of feminism and the counter-culture movement). You would expect some pretty contentious politickin'. Moreso than today. The issues were just bigger back then.

I think there's ample room in there to argue that the rise of the religious right has become an unnecessarily polarizing force in politics today while still acknowledging that a sort of detente has taken place between the left and the right as the political issues have evolved.

Ross,
Before laying out why I’m inclined to disagree, what did you think of the rest of the piece?

Given that the 60s issues of Vietnam, civil rights, and women’s liberation were contentious matters in their own right; given that the early Cold War, when the Soviet Union seemed a plausible rival, provided a context for intense domestic political conflict; given that the Depression had plenty of secular causes for political drama, e.g. twenty-five percent unemployment ... doesn’t the religious context for much of the post–60s culture clash seem noteworthy by way of contrast?

That is, there seems to be less of an overweening secular set of issues around which to fight nowadays, real economic woes and Iraq notwithstanding, and so one could argue that the division we see between red and blue America, however exaggerated and exacerbated by pundits’ facile contrasts, does owe something distinctive to religiosity in politics. We might finally be relatively more unified but for the influence of this issue (whic is not to deny the relevance of other issues, including policy differences). Perhaps the merits of a religiously inflected politics outweigh its liabilities (that’s a separate issue), but there does seem to me at first glance to have been a real cost in political unity, and arguably in political equality, as well (agnostics are apparently not viable candidates for national office).

Jeff,
You beat me to it ....

Douthat is right to say that "religious conservatism's intermingling of politics and metaphysics - is actually a more or less constant feature of American life". The problem of the religious right is that it revived the most ugly and mediocre form of religious conservatism: fundamentalism. And the consequences Linker deplores, are not going away. Of course, it is yet to see that cionservatives consider such consequences as nasty as they are, since nothing is more convinient to a conservative than the idea of theo-nationalism the fundamentalists and their allies have pushed over the public square

I realize that there's been a certain amount of this since the founding of this country, but I don't think it is healthy, in the long term, for people to be making religiously-based political arguments and for such arguments to be taking hold in the public discourse.

An argument that the government should do X because God wants it is a conversation stopper. There's no way that people who believe that God wants different things can form a consensus or moderate their views or compromise.

Further, it happens that a lot of what God seems to "want" nowadays is very bad stuff. I'll leave aside abortion rights-- that's a very contested issue-- but it certainly is bad for society that conceptions of God are standing in the way of gay rights, sex education, and especially Middle East peace.

The truth is that nobody knows what God wants, which is a really good reason to keep Her out of our politics.

Why is the argument that God wants something an illegitimate conversation-stopper, whereas the argument that the people behind the veil of ignorance agreed to something is a fruitful philosophical insight? To me it seems equally hard to interrogate the lawgiver in either case.

"Why is the argument that God wants something an illegitimate conversation-stopper, whereas the argument that the people behind the veil of ignorance agreed to something is a fruitful philosophical insight? To me it seems equally hard to interrogate the lawgiver in either case."

It's utterly impossible to interrogate "god." Though Zeus told me he thinks you're a moron. Credit that if you want.

Not only is it impossible to interrogate God, but the veil of ignorance (i.e., the principle that moral rules should be evaluated based on a position where one doesn't know what circumstances one will be born into, e.g., what one's race, gender, social class, or nationality might be) actually is a device that reminds us of something that I thought most Christians actually believed, i.e., the religious version of it is "there but for the grace of God go I".

In other words, you have to pick rules that would still be fair if you were in different circumstances. The fact that rules would still be fair in a variety of circumstances is a pretty good indicator that they are, in fact, fair.

So I don't see how a philosophical criterion that helps one evaluate the fairness of a set of rules is comparable to an appeal to religious authority.

I should add something else. I never knew that the veil of ignorance was even controversial before I saw it bashed on quite vehemently by some religious folks in these comment threads. It seemed rather self-evident to me that rules and ethical principles were likely to be more fair if they operated fairly with respect to people in different circumstances. Apparently, however, there are a fair number of religious conservatives who really can't stand Rawls and see his theories as a threat. The things you learn.

Linker thinks politics in America now is polarized?! He should check out the 1790s.

Speaking only for myself -

There are really seperate but related issues here. One is the extent to which the religious right has succeeded achieving it's policy goals. Looked at on this level, it's easy to conclude that people like Marash are a little overwrought.

But I would say that the rise of the religious right has been instrumental in the political success of movement conservatism. It may be ironic that the religious right's support of movement conservatism has paid them minimal dividends in terms of their core issues, but from the perspective of someone who thinks that movement conservatism has done massive and permanent damage to the polity, it is not much consolation that most of the damage has come from policies that are not the top priority of the religious right (endless war, the national security state, tax cuts leading to an impending fiscal disaster, etc).

LarryM writes: "It may be ironic that the religious right's support of movement conservatism has paid them minimal dividends in terms of their core issues, but from the perspective of someone who thinks that movement conservatism has done massive and permanent damage to the polity, it is not much consolation that most of the damage has come from policies that are not the top priority of the religious right (endless war, the national security state, tax cuts leading to an impending fiscal disaster, etc)."

I wouldn't totally dismiss a connection between the religious right and the ease with which the Bushpigs were able to sell the idea of a (truly pointless) war against Iraq. There was a lot of oddball support for the war among the "Left Behind" crowd, and that's a really big crowd.

First off, I think Ross is skating backwards here to some extent -- fundamentalist Protestantism, sure, has been around for a long time in this country, in its modern form since the 1920s at least (I think comparisons with the Great Awakenings and contemporary fundamentalists are pretty facile); but never, until the later 1970s, did it become a movement seeking political power and to reshape the State to suit its own goals.

Second, I think there's a regional aspect to all of this that is sort of alluded to in one of the posts above, but which should be more explicitly fleshed out. After all, after the ostensible repudiation of Jim Crow in the wake of the 1950s-60s Civil Rights movement, Southerners eager to point to something distinct, and uniquely virtuous, about their region might be inclined to point to its above-average religious fervor. I mean, you can't really say in 1978, if you're a Southern nationalist, that the vestiges of "the peculiar institution" of slavery are the positive content of your regional identity. Ergo, religion.

Not to say there is anything calculating or mechanistic about this, just that a self-definition of religiosity may have been so succesful precisely because, after the legal dismantling of the Jim Crow society, you get a vacuum, and something goes in its wake.

Of course, one also has to think about the Religious Right in places like Nebraska and California that never were "Jim Crow" in the Deep South sense.

I wouldn't totally dismiss a connection between the religious right and the ease with which the Bushpigs were able to sell the idea of a (truly pointless) war against Iraq. There was a lot of oddball support for the war among the "Left Behind" crowd, and that's a really big crowd.

OTOH, other elements of the religious right tend to be more isolationist/less interventionist than your average progressive. So it balances out to some extent.

And how big, really, is the left behind crowd?

For what it's worth, as I said over at Larison's blog, the quoted paragraph is almost predictably inflammatory; it's there to rile people up, while Damon then goes on to make a series of smart (if, I think, overreaching) arguments. It's too late to say, but I'll say it again: don't take the bait--argue instead with what he actually has to say about Marsh.

And how big, really, is the left behind crowd?

Judging from the book sales, it's big enough to be quite troublesome.

On the other hand, I suppose just because people buy the books doesn't necessarily mean they really believe it.

Dilan quotes LarryM and says: "And how big, really, is the left behind crowd?

Judging from the book sales, it's big enough to be quite troublesome.

On the other hand, I suppose just because people buy the books doesn't necessarily mean they really believe it."

In a country where half of the population thinks evolution is bunk and most fundamentalists expect Jesus to "return" in their lifetimes I think it's safe to say it's a damn big crowd.

I've read the books myself - I always like to keep an eye on the wackaloons. John Hagee's been in one or two of the Cloud Ten Endtimes movies - it's the same company that's doing the Left Behind movies. I have every reason to think these folks welcome war in the Middle East - any war - as a sign that their fantasies are on the edge of fulfillment.

well, look, obviously if you disagree with the religious right's various policy objectives, you'll think that its rise ("ascendancy" seems like a little much, doesn't it?) has been bad for the United States

I, for one, am opposed to many of the religious right's policy objectives:

--creating the conditions for the End Times to come about
--persecuting gay people
--persecuting non-Christians (and in some cases Catholics)

and many more. And I do believe that it should be obvious.

(Given that noted Jew-hater Billy Graham has counseled multiple presidents, serious asshole Pat Robertson is a major Republican player, and child-beater James Dobson has a hand in picking Supremes, well, ascendancy may be the right word. Or maybe it's not the right word, but the fact that major religious lunatics are a major part of the Republican Party is quite disturbing. That this isn't obvious to some theoretically sensible people is too.)

How do you guys come up with this crap? You can carry on forever patting each other on the back. Your only disagreements seem to be about whether fundamentalists (is that the right term?) love persecuting jews, waging endless war, or persecuting gays the most. I'm sure I forgot somebody else they love persecuting, but I have yet to actually drink the kool aid so I haven't been totally enlightened.

How can you wonder why Ross never responds when it is clear that you are a bunch of loons.

Danny DeVito says: "You can carry on forever patting each other on the back. Your only disagreements seem to be about whether fundamentalists (is that the right term?) love persecuting jews, waging endless war, or persecuting gays the most."

I think it's a three-way tie - for second. What they really love the most is the idea that history is moving their way.

Which it isn't. And that's a very good thing, because they're fucking idiots.

Russel Arben Fox's point above that the rest of Linker's article is perceptive and worth reading may be true, but I stopped reading after the first paragraph. (Although I had bought the magazine and read some of the other articles.) So, from Linker's point of view, this sort of language might not be the absolute best rhetorical device. So many on the left (see MoeLarryandJesus on any day) seem to think that smashmouth insult is the best way to win readers and converts.

Maybe that works for some, but, judging from the New Republic's circulation figures, not many.

Dilan,

I accept the veil of ignorance, for the most part, as a framework for thinking. I don't think it does what you want it to do, though, and I think it has severe limitations.

For example, Rawls takes the veil of ignorance and he says that we need a liberal society because behind the veil of ignorance most people would choose freedom rather than security (e.g. people would not like to be locked up for crimes they didn't commit.)

Really?

I think the exact opposite. I think most people would take the chance of being the poor guy that the Chinese police shoot summarrily if it meant living in a society with no street crime. Hence I think that liberal society is not just wrong but actually contrary to what people's natural yearnings are. I think virtue and justice are more important than freedom.

Rawls' problem is also that he acts as if people are solely concerned with maximizing material self-interest, and not about moral principles. Which isn't true. For example you can make two different arguments as to why usury is wrong. One is that it exploits and impoverishes very poor people. The other is that there's something inherently unnatural about separating work and reward. I would say it's wrong for both reasons. But the veil of ignorance only really addresses the first- the exploitation argument.


y81's right: Linker's rhetorical device is dumb it does more to occlude his argument than illuminate. But let's join the argument - has the CR been bad for American politics? It's a dumb claim to suggest that the CR "injected" theological claims into politics; you can dance around things as much as you want, but at least the MLK-led part of the civil rights movement is inextricably tied to theological claims. So too were important sections of the "progressive" movements in the early 20th century, as well as the temperance and abolitionist movements. (I'd recommend Morone's book on the "politics of sin" as a nice reminder to that point). As to divisiveness, it seems to me the complaint really just amounts to whining that not everyone agrees with the elite academic (and liberal) consensus and that the two parties do, in fact, differ in important ways - and are willing to argue those differences out in the political arena. (I admit, though, that I've never really understood the "divisiveness" claim, since the alternative - unity - seems to make democratic politics rather unimportant; of course, that's a criticism that's long been made of Rawlsian-style liberalism, and rightly so).

More to the point, I think a good case can be made that the CR has been good for American politics, at least in the long-term. Prior to its emergence (and, really, you have to date it to the late 1940s, with the emergence of neo-evangelicals like Henry, Ockenga, et. al.), most conservative protestants were holed up in their cultural enclaves unwilling to engage the broader political culture. They had a very simplistic, even manichean view of the world. One thing the CR has done has brought those folks into political life and given them a chance to develop much more interesting, much more sophisticated, and (I think) much more fruitful ways of thinking about the relationship between their faith and politics. If all you're doing is keeping an eye on Pat Robertson or his ilk, you're likely to miss the ways in which there's a real blossoming of theologically informed political thought among conservative protestants, something that I think will bear real fruit in the future. It's not likely end up in policy positions favored by some of the more liberal folks around here, but it will be very far from the "Christian nation" stuff that is too prevalent in circles now and will, perhaps, get us out of the dead-end of thinking that politics ever could ignore or stay away from touching on our deepest, even "metaphysical" views.

How's that, Russell?

For example you can make two different arguments as to why usury is wrong. One is that it exploits and impoverishes very poor people. The other is that there's something inherently unnatural about separating work and reward.

Well it seems to me that there's usury and then there's usury and that a Rawlsian veil of ignorance is good tool for making the distinction. Surely there exists an interest rate that fairly compensates the capitalist for foregoing the use of his money for a certain time that is also not so exorbitantly high that it exploits and impoverishes the borrower.

I understand that this view has an unsatisfactory lack of reliance upon groundless claims concerning the "unnaturalness of laziness" and that it also fails to conjecture in a misty-eyed romantic fashion about everyone's inner willingness to be shot by the Chinese police. That you see these wants as serious flaws is evidence that you are less concerned about solving problems in an equitable fashion through reason and compromise and more concerned with foisting your own weird peccadillos on everyone else. And that is the very definition of a conversation stopper.

Oh Dilan, you must really impress them at the coffee shop. With hard work, all of you, except MoeLarry, may graduate to writing annoying letters to the editor of the Atlantic's print version.

"I am so right that I'm angry, and so I need to demean the religious right because they're not as smart as I am." That's the undercurrent in most of these posts. You condescend and caricaturize the religious right as a bunch of ignorant, feeble-minded boobs, which would imply, I would think, incompetence at a very basic level. You then act as though they pose a great threat. Which is it?

Sorry, that's what comes with being elite and smater than everyone else. No one will except how darned right you are, but you should keep trying.

Sorry, that's what comes with being elite and smater than everyone else. No one will except how darned right you are, but you should keep trying.

Great point, Ferrell. Take note heliocentrists, evolutionists, and people who don't understand that fags cause hurricanes. No one believes you!

Apparently, however, there are a fair number of religious conservatives who really can't stand Rawls and see his theories as a threat.

I don't think Rawls is so much a threat as a useless masturbatory non-starter. Is that better?

but it certainly is bad for society that conceptions of God are standing in the way of gay rights, sex education, and especially Middle East peace.

Hrm. That's your list of the bad stuff the Christian right is responsible for?

On "gay rights", if you mean same-sex marriage, I suppose you're right -- but it seems to be in the long-term nigh-inevitable anyway, and in the short run not of much consequence. That, despite great opposition by religious bodies that maintain anything beyond an attenuated half-hearted theism, gay marriage is on the books, suggests the alarm here is outsized. Really, that a revamping of a fundamental social institution like marriage in such a radical form is even conceivable should be a sign as to how absolutely triumphant liberal secularism and anti-traditionalism are. You folks should throw yourselves a little party instead of getting the vapors.

Sex education? Isn't there quite a bit of that around -- was when I was in school, and that was dog's ears ago. And doesn't some of that data now in suggests that not only is abstinence-based sex ed ineffective, but that sex education in general doesn't actually have much "bang" for the buck? Liberalism always over-estimates the power and effectiveness of education to change anything.

Middle East peace? If you think there would be peace in the Middle East if not for the Christian Right in the US, I think you are barking up the wrong tree. I'm not even sure how much US policy on Israel is really driven by that factor, though it certainly supports current inclinations.

"Religious Right" or not, I think Rawls is not at all "obvious" to anyone with Burkean leanings. Rawls is a non-rooted thought experiment approach, a cloudy pipe dream of how society might be: by explicitly throwing away all history, tradition, and "circumstances as they are" Rawls encourages us to consider the most abstract form of justice, ignoring practicalities and (in fact) the actual diversity of human beings and interests. As Hector notes, he also diminishes the power of non-utilitarian roots of ideas of justice -- that one in a certain "position" after the island-placement might "deserve" a bad lot (say you just happen to end up a sociopath) becomes a problem in a way it perhaps should not be. In a sense, Rawls is problematic for the same reasons that Rousseau, Locke, and even Hobbes are -- Locke and Hobbes sometimes get a nicer appreciation by conservatives because of their implications, but in all cases there is an argument from a non-historical imaginary "initial state" that isn't grounded in reality. Conservatives tend to draw principles of justice either from (divine) authority or from historically rooted things such as traditions and constitutions, and are not really (if they're conservative) going to be that comfortable with methods based on _thought experiment about non-existing conditions_.

I don't think Rawls is so much a threat as a useless masturbatory non-starter. Is that better?

No, it isn't, Marquis. I am not saying that Rawls discovered the Philosopher's Stone or something. But to say the veil of ignorance is "useless" is transparently wrong. The veil of ignorance reminds us that we have to analyze moral principles by placing ourselves in the shoes of other people in other circumstances and asking whether it is good for them. There are many similar principles in other traditions. For instance, economists believe that we should value everyone's interests equally. And many religious people, as I noted, were taught that "there but for the grace of God go I" which is a variant on the same principle.

So to call it "useless" and "masterbatory" is to demean a key philosophical insight.

But calling it "useless" and "masterbatory" does say a lot about you, Marquis. You see, I think what you don't want to do is admit that any secular thinker can generate useful moral principles. You want your God to have a monopoly on that. So, you unintelligently tear down any secular moral philosophy.

The veil of ignorance, as I said, isn't stupid. In fact, many Christians believe a version of it, at least unwittingly. What it is, though, is a threat. And we can't have it. Christianity has to protect its turf, and if that means acting as an anti-intellectual and tearing down good ideas, so be it.

With respect to the gay rights, sex education, and Middle East peace issues, I simply note that religious fundamentalists stand for far more than marriage amendments. They fought to uphold sodomy laws, they fight the Employment Non Discrimination Act and gays in the military, etc. They clearly fight any sex education that actually teaches people how to have safe sex.

And I am not claiming that "but for conservative Christians, there would be Middle East peace". What I am saying is that they are forming a constituency advocating policies that make Israeli-Palestinian negotiations more difficult than they already are.

Conservatives tend to draw principles of justice either from (divine) authority or from historically rooted things such as traditions and constitutions, and are not really (if they're conservative) going to be that comfortable with methods based on _thought experiment about non-existing conditions_.

Thanks for proving my point, Marquis. Basically, you are opposed to any sort of intelligent thinking about morals, because using our brains might lead us to conclude that God's alleged laws are full of it. Accordingly, no form of moral reasoning that doesn't come either directly from God or from the practices of the communities who invented your God is acceptable.

One last thing:

Here's an example of the destructiveness of the religious right in American politics-- they are going after birth control pills:

http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/05/pill_kills.php#comments

Ok, I was unfair to Rawls, who is "interesting" -- but he's over-adored. For, to some extent, exactly the reasons you give as favorable to him: "The veil of ignorance reminds us that we have to analyze moral principles by placing ourselves in the shoes of other people in other circumstances and asking whether it is good for them. There are many similar principles in other traditions."

What is _new_ in Rawls is unconvincing, to those disdainful of pure thought experiment for this kind of thing. What is not new is, by and large, the Golden Rule, or a variation thereof -- not a novel principle to remake the world as liberal, but a much older idea dressed up in new philosophical clothing. "You see, I think what you don't want to do is admit that any secular thinker can generate useful moral principles." -- but you, yourself, point out that in some sense the essence of Rawls is not at all novel. I'm not an anti-intellectual, Dilan, and you know it -- but I don't agree with your particular intellectual tradition. That's part of being an intellectual, last I checked. I dislike Rawls' ideas for reasons that are not unlike the reasons you don't find Alasdair MacIntyre writing books noting how we can stop looking at virtue now that we have Rawls to solve it all for us.

Basically, you are opposed to any sort of intelligent thinking about morals, because using our brains might lead us to conclude that God's alleged laws are full of it.

By considering tradition-rooted kinds of thinking "un-intelligent" you're the one being an anti-intellectual idiot, Dilan. There is not one community of intellectuals here, and one of know-nothings. Burke, Kirk, and MacIntyre are at the very least your equals (and, really, your betters). And the traditions and ideas I consider in looking at moral thinking are not limited to Christian societies -- and you know that. The Greeks had quite a bit to say on the matter that wasn't nonsense. My problem is with pure thought-experiment methods that throw out history and rootedness. I consider this a BAD METHODOLOGY for intellectual reasons, in the same way that I dislike some kinds of science that tend towards pure mathematical reasonsing with an inborn hostility to empirical experiment and verification. They're not always useless or invalid, but they're generally problematic, especially when elevated above more observant-of-reality-as-we-find-it methods.

Marquis,

(no fieldwork today b/c of the rain so i might aswell procrastinate....)

I would note that Rousseau is perhaps not deserving of the kind of scorn that he sometimes gets from conservatives. He shared with a lot of conservatives a contempt for the Enlightenment and for 'pure reason', and however heterodox he may have been, my understanding is that he did believe in God.

I think that the veil of ignorance, per se, is a useful concept in moral reasoning, though it's obviously not the beginnng and end of morality. I disagree with many of the specific conclusions that Rawls draws of course. More generally I don't think you can derive morality from pure reason.

Here's an example of the destructiveness of the religious right in American politics-- they are going after birth control pills:

Sure. And what do you think their odds of success are? I mean, Daniel Larison and company are "going after" all of modernity, to some extent, and we probably have as good a chance as these folks.


I forgot to add,

Re: For instance, economists believe that we should value everyone's interests equally.

This is supposed to be a _good_ thing? I would say that's one of the most commonly cited problems with modern (capitalist) economics, that it gives equal weight to the preferences of every person (and that's not really true, it really gives equal weight to the preference of every _dollar_.)

So in other words person A wants to spend money on preserving wildlife, and person B wants to spend it on buying porn. Person C makes their money by playing the stock market, and person D makes their money by catching fish so the rest of us can eat. Person E is a moneylender who exacts exorbitant interest from the poor, and person F is a doctor who runs a free clinic for the poor. Person G is a cop who takes criminals off the street, and person H is a lawyer who puts them back on. Their preferences should all be weighted equally? Modern neoclassical economics says yes, every dollar that people want to spend is a vote for one set of priorities rather than another. For many of us, that's exactly the problem with modern economics.

The broader problem with the Rawlsian metaphysic is that it doesn't consider _which_ people in _what_ other circumstances we are supposed to look at. It treats all 'preferences' and 'desires' the same without trying to assess whether some of these preferences are better than others.

I'm certainly not the world's biggest Orwell fan but I think he put it well here:

"I am a degenerate modem semi-intellectual who would die if I did not get my early morning cup of tea and my New Statesman every Friday. Clearly I do not, in a sense, 'want' to return to a simpler, harder, probably agricultural way of life. In the same sense I don't 'want' to cut down my drinking, to pay my debts, to take enough exercise, to be faithful to my wife, etc., etc. But in another and more permanent sense I do want these things, and perhaps in the same sense I want a civilization in which 'progress' is not definable as making the world safe for little fat men."

So in Dilan's liberal world view, how do we discriminate between one set of preferences and another?

I'm not an anti-intellectual, Dilan, and you know it -- but I don't agree with your particular intellectual tradition.

Marquis, when you say that you don't trust anything that doesn't come from God or tradition to generate valid or useful ethical principles, yes, you are being anti-intellectual.

The funny thing is your religion isn't anti-intellectual at all-- the Catholic Church has taught for many centuries, at least as far back as Aquinas, about the importance of human reason.

Sure. And what do you think their odds of success are? I mean, Daniel Larison and company are "going after" all of modernity, to some extent, and we probably have as good a chance as these folks.

I find it funny that people who are constantly telling us how principles matter than real-world effects tell us that we secular liberals have nothing to worry about because even though many religious conservatives believe in these principles, they'll never be politically successful in the real world.

I tend to disvalue those arguments that are most detached from concrete reality. Aquinas was also a follower of Aristotle on reason -- and thus knows that knowledge in the mind originates in the senses (to over-compress).

My point is more like the skepticism of the British empiricists about "science" that pontificates without doing any experiments, or looking at the data. I suppose some continentals DID consider this anti-intellectual, and there was too much discounting of the peculiar effectiveness of mathematics, but still -- Einstein was a "thinker" but he also had data to explain, and we wouldn't consider him very useful if he hadn't made observable predictions.

The analogy is far from precise, but I think it's not completely absurd. And, again, to the extent that Rawls is useful, it seems to me that he DOES derive from tradition and revelation -- he just supports a "similar" conclusion (plus some conclusions he prefers for their own merit, not because they really fit his model well) by a thought experiment. And then takes the details of the (not convincing to everyone) thought experiment to justify further dubious conclusions.

Masturbatory and a non-starter was over-harsh. But I think Rawls is seen as far, far, far, too central, and as somehow magically overthrowing all competing (virtue-based, for example) models, when he doesn't have the power to do that, UNLESS YOU ALREADY AGREE WITH HIS METHODS AND CONCLUSIONS TO START WITH.

For the record, Marquis, I don't find Rawls to be "central" myself. I just think that the veil of ignorance is a useful tool for reminding us of the importance of not taking our own circumstances for granted or assuming that because a rule seems fair to us, that it is fair in its application to people who are born into very different realities. It isn't the only way of reaching that truth, but it is an important thing to keep in mind.

I also think you are conflating the fact that one can derive the veil of ignorance concept from tradition and revelation, which is true, with whether one needs tradition and revelation to derive it. In fact, there are secular justifications for a principle of equality (as well as religious ones) and those secular justifications can get you to the veil of ignorance.

And the broader point is that tradition and religion can lead you astray as often as they can lead you to useful and good ethical concepts. I think you know this quite well with respect to tradition-- obviously, slavery and coverture, among other things, were common Western traditions. But it is also true about religion-- I am sure there is a long list of things that God was once thought (or is still thought by some) to mandate that you would think are quite wrong.

The point is, in the end, you have to use your brain, and sometimes the principles that your brain generates will be contrary to tradition and even contrary to religious teaching. And rather than making human reason suspect, this actually makes specific traditions and religious teachings suspect.

I think that in actuality, what I am saying is not that different from modern Catholic teaching on these issues (though obviously I differ on particulars). The Church didn't pick a fight with Charles Darwin, for example (as some denominations of Christianity did and do); the hierarchy is quite willing to accept that human beings, using their brains, might be able to falsify portions of Scripture.

Human reason has allowed us to see that many traditions and religious teachings were wrong. It will continue to do so. There is no reason to be suspect of ethical principles derived from human reason simply because they contravene religious teachings or societal traditions. I believe the vulgar way of saying this is "God wants us to use our brains."

And rather than making human reason suspect, this actually makes specific traditions and religious teachings suspect.

Nonsense, It makes both suspect, unless your brain is perfect. Mine isn't. I KNOW, from listening to you argue, Dilan, that yours is at least as faulty as mine. Rawls is also faulty. The problem with this version of reason is that it trusts everyone's brain, but even the smartest man is pretty stupid, on most points. The species MAY have some collective wisdom, once in a while; the rare genius, in some highly specific area, may be sharp as a tack, but in general individual reason (including my own) is as suspect as tradition or reason. Not understanding this is the key (in my view) limitation of modern liberals: they are often considered arrogant elitists because they think somebody (and maybe they are the ones they've been waiting for!) can just "figger everything out from scratch."

God wants us to use our brains, but not worship them or pretend they are infallible. Lots of brains are (sometimes, with sharp principles for evaluation here) better than one or two brains.

In other words, the widespread religious and traditional acceptance of something like (at the most abstract level, not in his specific conclusions drawn from it) Rawls' veil is a much better argument for that principle than Rawls (not very compelling, in my view) argument.

Also, I think Darwin quite simply didn't falsify any scripture, in the sense you mean (Augustine was dealing with non-literal Genesis interpretations well before Darwin had the "gall to ask").

Moreover, Rawls isn't doing what Darwin did at all -- if Darwin had just dreamed up the idea of natural selection and had no empirical evidence, he'd have been (rightly) ignored. Rawls isn't arguing from observations or reality, he's making a claim, based on a thought experiment about a non-existent and impossible situation, as to how reality _should_ be ordered. Those are very, very, different things. Darwin was a great scientist, one of the Great Masters of the Ages. Rawls was a facile and intelligent man who somewhat lucked into a way of stating something that has been beloved by liberals partly for the ease with which it can generate the ideas beloved by "pristine moderate liberal minds" and partly precisely because it discards all the "baggage" of history and reality that troubles progressive ideas.

Dilan,

"Reason" alone can't prove anything about morality. Reason helps you go from a set of axioms to a conclusion about what ought to be done. But reason alone can't supply you with the axioms. You can't prove by pure reason that women are ontologically equal to men, or that political freedom is important, or that mercy is better than cruelty, or that generosity is better than selfishness, or that the hungry should be fed and the sick cured, or that people are entitled to the fruits of their labor. You either accept those things or you don't, but those axioms can only be derived on the basis of native intuition not on the basis of reason.

It seems to me that The M of C and Hector are being deliberately obtuse because they just hate "reason" insofar as it gainsays their own particular brand of hocus-pokery.

Dilan Esper gets to the point here:

I also think you are conflating the fact that one can derive the veil of ignorance concept from tradition and revelation, which is true, with whether one needs tradition and revelation to derive it. In fact, there are secular justifications for a principle of equality (as well as religious ones) and those secular justifications can get you to the veil of ignorance.

Imagine an atheist, a Jew and a devotee of the Flying Spaghetti Monster trying to agree on what constitutes acceptable behavior, given that they must co-exist on their small desert island. Rawls' point is that tools such as the veil of ignorance will aid in the solution of these disputes in a way that adherence to Pastafarian truths will not.

Rawls is not engaged in a project to derive morality from the exercise of pure reason (Duh!), but is instead trying to elucidate ways for so many idiots to figure out how to get along without killing each other over their improbable, unprovable and incompatible beliefs. Well, you can lead a horse to water...

God wants us to use our brains, but not worship them or pretend they are infallible. Lots of brains are (sometimes, with sharp principles for evaluation here) better than one or two brains.

That's a good argument for contemporary moral consensus. But it's a lousy argument for tradition, which was the product of brains operating on a lot less information than we have now.

And it's no argument at all for religion, unless one concedes the human origins of it. I doubt that's a move you are interested in making.

Rawls isn't arguing from observations or reality, he's making a claim, based on a thought experiment about a non-existent and impossible situation, as to how reality _should_ be ordered.

Well, again, I am not mounting a full-throated defense of Rawls, but you are asking the impossible of a moral philosopher if you are saying he or she has to live up to the same standards of empericism as a biologist.

All secular ethics deals in hypotheticals and thought experiments. Indeed, even quite a few of the arguments made by religious conservatives against abortion and gay rights (I mean the ones that don't start with "God said so") are thought experiments and hypotheticals. (E.g., the argument that recognizing gay marriage leads inexorably to the justification of polygamy.)

The thing is, you seem to be effectively against the entire enterprise of secular moral philosophy. You seem to think that it any theory of ethics somehow illegitimate if it doesn't arise from tradition or religion. Your worldview would not only exclude Rawls but large parts of Kant and Locke. I don't think that someone like Gandhi would fare very well either.

Uh, Dilan, Gandhi was an extremely religious man. His opposition to birth control, modern medicine, and for that matter eating and sexual intercourse in general had roots in Hindu asceticism. He refused an armed escort largely because he believed that it would be interfering with providence. Gandhi was of course wrong about many things but his wrongness had little to do with being 'secular'.

I don't much like Locke (but you probably guessed that) and I think that Kant's categorical imperative breaks down after a few minute's questioning by a clever schoolboy. So you'll have to try again.


And the veil of ignorance actually says little about how to solve religious conflicts, since religion is not something immutable like race or gender. I don't think that the state should be neutral between competing religious conceptions, at least not in a country that is by demography and culture basically Christian.

Your worldview would not only exclude Rawls but large parts of Kant and Locke.

Yes, and no. I don't buy much of Kant or Locke, actually -- to head in the clouds, too abstract, and too unrooted in actual human nature for my tastes. More original and important than Rawls, but still wrong, in large part, and not necessarily wrong in useful ways, if you ask me. Note that I think Aristotle, for all his numerous flaws, was more useful in that his notions made less attempt to sever any link to something so unpleasant as observation of behavior.

Kant's better than Locke, if you ask me. Locke starts with blank slate notions that just don't hold any water at all, and Kant slightly dodges that bullet.

In general, getting to "ought" without a metaphysics is very hard, I think, and while it's not a bad thing to work at for various reasons, the efforts are largely, to me, going to be uncompelling in some way or other.

In general, getting to "ought" without a metaphysics is very hard, I think, and while it's not a bad thing to work at for various reasons, the efforts are largely, to me, going to be uncompelling in some way or other.

I don't think that's true, but let's assume it is. The problem is that getting to "ought" without a consensus about metaphysics is absolutely necessary, because: (a) by definition, at most only one of the thousands of asserted conceptions of metaphysics can be true and perhaps none are-- all the rest are false; (b) the polity is comprised of people of vastly divergent metaphysical views; and (c) since metaphysical views cannot be proven true (absent an obvious and unarguable supernatural intervention) and believers will continue to have faith in them even in the face of evidence of their falsity, it is impossible to form consensus except as to very, very general principles.

So whether or not secular moral philosophy satisfies you, the fact of the matter is that it is the only basis for keeping a society that respects religious pluralism together. (One could, of course, adopt an official church and use state coercion to force people to profess their faith in it, but that would be both evil and impractical.)

You may not agree with it, you may think it is fruitless, but it is the only answer.

"I don't think that the state should be neutral between competing religious conceptions, at least not in a country that is by demography and culture basically Christian."

Interesting point in that I went to Bible College and once considered myself a devout Born Again Christian who believed -- more or less -- that Scripture was in some way all divinely inspired.

However, the Christian I called myself was quite a bit different from my classmates. We all agreed on what the Bible said yet in action and politics we could not have been more different.

Hence in the real world you extreme examples of this difference like the Amish and Methodists -- both Christians.

So how does one have the government somehow protect or embrace America as a Christian nation? Which kind of Christian are you talking about?

There are WORLDS of difference between Martin Luther King and Pat Robertson and -- guess what? -- both would be right in calling themselves Christians as that term is loosely defined in the New Testament.

And that is precisely why the government should stay out of religion altogether even if this is somehow a nation with a Christian tradition of some kind.

But Dilan, it's not Rawls (or Kant) that keeps us all from cutting each others' throats or whatever. It's tradition, inertia, manners, social disapproval, use of coercive force, brainless respect for law, and the like -- a whole host of things, many of which are often undermined and assaulted by liberalism in its purer forms. The theories have little to do with it, though they certainly did have SOME influence on the American founding and constitutional order -- but even then prudential derivations from English history and law were as important, and perhaps more important in the long run that the "purer" ideas of Locke.

I don't have trouble with not shooting your neighbor, or me and my neighbor who disagee about God agreeing not to burgle each other. These things are fine. I don't have to think Rawls is terribly useful for that business, though, or deserving of the intellectual respect he receives.

Re: by definition, at most only one of the thousands of asserted conceptions of metaphysics can be true and perhaps none are-- all the rest are false

I don't agree with the above at all. While there are metaphysical tenets that completely contradict one another and so canot both be true, there are metaphysical tenets that do not contradict and hence can be mutually true. Also, anyone with any decent training in math can tell you that there are equations that have multiple solutions, even infinite solutions, every one of which is true. Ditto, I think, for the metaphysical problem: it admits of multiple solutions which can all be valid solutions. (See also: Pyrrho's parable of the blind men and the elephant)

That is, the United States (or Europe) does not descend into a bloodbath of man against man because of John Rawls, or even because of John Locke.


I love how comments sections can devolved into intellectual pissing contest whenever a blogger comes in the vicinity of philosophy or religion. I agree that masturbatory is not a good adjective to describe Rawls. However, it is a good one to describe the debate between Hector, Marquis, and Dilan.

Ted:

You confuse a pissing contest with a circle jerk.

Dilan,

Sorry for mixing the metaphors but I was a least trying to be PG-13, for all the children that read this blog

Ted:

Don't worry, they are all over at the Miley Cyrus post.

Dilan,

I don't have a problem with religious toleration in matters of faith, although I would like to see a government that was more friendly to faith in general. I do have a problem with state neutrality in matters of morals. I think that in a Christian country the state should try and encourage people to adhere to a _broadly_ Christian understanding of morality- not a narrowly understood one. I believe that Christian thought and feeling should inform and inspire politics. I don't see why the state should remain neutral between competing religions and competing ideologies.

And I hope you are aware that there are plenty of states today with established religions and they are not 'evil'. Maybe about half of the LA countries have the Catholic church officially established, and in the others (with a few exceptions) there is generally an understanding that the Church can and should be a strong influence on society and politics. I'm not aware that any of those countries are considered fiercely oppressive of Santeros, Voodooists, Pentecostals, or their other religious minorities. (The Jews in some countries being a separate case.)

Hector:

Why the state should favor the mayoritarian religion in a country? What if the mayority was islamic or made of atheists? Or is your point that the goverment should favor only CHRISTIAN religion, no matter if it is mayoritarian or not? If so, Why should the goverment favor christian religion?

Sergio,

I believe that a (broadly) Christian, quasi-Christian, or Christianized morality is at least a reasonable approximation to the One True Morality, whereas I don't believe the same about a morality based on libertarianism, Islam, gay liberation theory, social Darwinism, etc. I wouldn't try and compel anyone to subscribe to a certain _faith_, but I would try and ensure that those broad aspects of Christian morality that consonant with our native moral intuitions are the guiding principles of society. For example, I think that what Christian morality says about feeding the hungry, distribution of societal resources, protecting the environment, abortion, torture, or gay marriage is also self-evident based on our native moral intuitions.

In matters of faith, it's less important to me that the government promote a particular faith than that it promote the idea that faith is a good thing. I'm very open to the idea that because of their particular history some countries like France or the United States are constitutively secular countries and should remain secular. On the other hand a country like Argentina or Ireland or Poland is _by its very nature_ a Christian nation. Christian faith is tied up with the very essence of the nation and a secular Ireland would cease to be Irish in a very real sense, and I don't want to see that happen.

What's your view on economics? Why do you think that the state should favor, say, neoclassical economics over Marxian economics, or vice versa?

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