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Supreme Court Supermajorities, Cont.

01 Jul 2008 07:20 pm

Naturally, the idea isn't original to me: Jed Shugerman, an assistant law professor at Harvard, recently wrote a paper making the case for a 6-3 rule (though you'd need a Harvard ID or a Lexis/Nexis password to read it). He writes in an email:

There's actually a long record of these proposals throughout American history, but oddly, there are fewer efforts now even though there are more 5-4 decisions. You don't need to amend the constitution to force the Court to follow this rule. I argue that Congress could legislate this rule under Article III as a "regulation" of and "exception" to the Court's jurisdiction. But all you need is one judge -- the one in the middle -- to adopt this rule. Justice Kennedy, for example, could simply write, "I agree with many of the arguments by four of my colleagues that statute X is unconstitutional, but I do not believe we as a court should overturn the considered and democratically accountable wisdom of Congress without more consensus."

The rule does not create serious problems for lower courts. If a lower court rules that a statute is unconstitutional, the party losing that decision (the appellant) would regularly receive enough votes by the Justices (four) necessary for hearing the case, and then four Justices would be sufficient to preserve the statute as valid. If there are no other grounds for the party challenging the statute to prevail, then the party relying on the statute wins. But this is the problem in terms of practice. Five judges would not be enough to invalidate the statute, but those five could find other ways to limit the statute (a narrow interpretation of its text) or to rule in favor of the litigant challenging the statute. ln a legal system, you can only hope that judges will take rules seriously, and that applies to much more than the proposed supermajority rule. And that problem of judicial activism makes the turn to rules of judicial restraint all the more important, even if they can be evaded by some Justices some of the time.

Here's another variant on the argument.

Comments (7)

An unhappy consequence of this would that a law would be invalidated for individual cases (and persons) only, but stand for all others. Do we really want a nation where Mr Lawrence can disobey Texas' sodomy law with impunity while others can still be prosecuted under it, unless they too run to the courts for a personal exemption? Or where Jane Roe can ignore a law against abortion while other women go to jail? Kind of makes as mockery of "Equal justice under law".

If a justice were to declare that she actually regards a law as unconstitutional, but vote against her own view on the grounds that the legislature's opinion on constitutionality should take precedence over hers, that would be a transfer of "judicial power" from the court to the legislature in violation of Article III, and in my opinion, would constitute grounds for impeachment. We do not appoint and confirm justices to be sock-puppets for Congress.

"I argue that Congress could legislate this rule under Article III as a "regulation" of and "exception" to the Court's jurisdiction."

I recall that Congress does have some such authority to regulate the Court's jurisdiction, but this argument raises some interesting questions about the authority of one coordinate branch to regulate the internal affairs of another.

--Could Congress in effect insulate its laws from judicial review by heightening the burden for a coordinate branch to overturn them?
--Could Congress invoke the same authority to require a heightened authority only for some laws and not for others?
--Could Congress strip the Court of jurisdiction over classes of cases, such as all abortion or the 2d Amendment cases?
--Would this conflict with Marbury or some other precedent whereby the Court has interpreted the Constitution to authorize judicial review as it has been practicing it for many years?

Anyway, the question of how you would implement the supermajority rule would be the subject of another interesting parlor discussion.

By raising the bar for overturning precedents, obviously this proposal would more effectively preserve the status quo.

If the cases weren't controversial, they generally wouldn't make it to the Supreme Court in the first place.

The problem, as I see it, is that laws only have to be passed by a bare majority. Those laws that are controversial, or close, could pass on 51-49 margins, when it's clear that the majority barely has legitimacy on its side. To then require the court to have to overturn via a supermajority when it only took a majority to create it in the first place? It seems a little much.

Now, if we could force all laws to be passed only by supermajority (the de facto case in the Senate), then that would be talking.

Justice Kennedy, for example, could simply write, "I agree with many of the arguments by four of my colleagues that statute X is unconstitutional, but I do not believe we as a court should overturn the considered and democratically accountable wisdom of Congress without more consensus."

No way. Kennedy is far too enamored of himself to even consider the possibility that he might not be far wiser than the legislature and the entire collective populace put together. Dispensing his "wisdom" is his favorite part of the job.

In a legal system, you can only hope that judges will take rules seriously

If there were any hope whatsoever of that happening, we wouldn't be having this conversation in the first place.

I'm sorry after Kelo ( a decision after the Sheriff of Nottingham's own heart) The deliberate ignorance of precedent in Hamdi, Hamdan, & Boumedienne; including a misrepresented footnote in Hamdan, deliberate omissions in Kennedy (re the US Code)mistating the verdict in Miller; it doesn't matter any more, what they decide.